In “Appraisal Arbitrage: In Case of Emergency, Break Glass” – a student note published in the Notre Dame Law Review (93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2191) – the author lays out a case for why appraisal, including appraisal arbitrage, remains critical to the overall scheme of shareholder protection. As the author observes, many a critique of appraisal focus on the “who” of recent appraisal cases, focusing their attention on the appraisal arbitrage strategy and decrying that arbitrageurs (as opposed to, one must believe, long term shareholders who may not be as well positioned as arbitrageurs to pursue an appraisal case) are bringing appraisal cases at all. The student note points out that this focus on “who” has lost sight of “why” appraisal exists in the first place and what has been revealed by many of the appraisal cases of the past: many appraisal cases are meritorious in that they reveal (and result in) premia to below-fair-value merger prices. The author also highlights critical research on what the appraisal remedy does for even shareholders who don’t exercise it: brings up merger premiums. The note concludes with a worthy summation of why appraisal remains a valuable remedy in the shareholder arsenal: “appraisal still has value as a deterrence method and as protection for minority shareholders. Shareholders need a functioning emergency switch in the form of the appraisal remedy, and Delaware, whatever its next actions in this space, must tread carefully to preserve it as such.”